Equilibria of Noncooperative Games

MD22.1 Nash Equilibria Are Superficial Correlated Equilibria Robert F. Nau, Sabrina Gomez, Pierre Hansen --- Duke Univ., Fuqua Sch. of Bus., Durham, NC 27708-0120, (rnau@mail.duke.edu)

It is well known that the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of a noncooperative game is a convex polyhedron that includes the Nash equilibria. We prove a remarkably simple yet surprising result: that the Nash equilibria must all lie on the surface of the correlated equilibrium polyhedron.

MD22.2 Nash & Correlated Equilibria of 2- & 3-Persons Games: An Empirical Study Sabrina Gomez, Pierre Hansen, Brigitte Jaumard, Robert F. Nau --- GERAD, , , ()

The sets of all Nash, correlated, Pareto optimal correlated and coalition proof correlated equilibria of bimatrix and of 3-persons games are studied. It is known that solutions in the last set can give substantially larger payoffs than Nash equilibria.

MD22.3 An Algorithm for All Extreme Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games Charles Audet, Pierre Hansen, Brigitte Jaumard, Gilles Savard --- GERAD & HEC, Polytech. of Montreal, 3000 ch. Cote-Ste-Catherine, Montreal, Quebec, H3T 2A7 , Canada (charlesa@crt.umontreal.ca)

The extreme equilibria of bimatrix games are enumerated in finite time by a branching scheme that exploits the KKT conditions of 2 pairs of parameterized LP s.

MD22.4 Correlated Equilibrium & Unilaterally Competitive Games Olivier De Wolf --- Univ. Catholique de Louvain, 25 Cours du Bia Bouquet, Louvain-la Neuve, 1348 , Belgium (dewolf@core.ucl.ac.be)

We propose to investigate some properties of correlated equilibria in some class of games commonly qualified as competitive. In particular, we show that in these kinds of games (including the n person case), there generally is no incentive for the players to correlate their strategies.

MD22.5 Extreme Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games Are Extreme Correlated Equilibria Pierre Hansen, Sabrina Gomez --- HEC, 3000 Ch Cote-Ste-Catherine, Montreal, Quebec, H3T 2A7 , Canada (pierreh@crt.umontreal.ca)

Polyhydral combinatorics are used to prove that in bimatrix games all extreme Nash equilibria are extreme correlated equilibria.