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W. Matthew Carlyle

W. Matthew Carlyle

W. Matthew Carlyle

Professor and Chair of the Operations Research Department at the Naval Postgraduate School

W. Matthew Carlyle, PhD, is Professor and Chair of the Operations Research Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. He received his B.S. in Information and Computer Science from Georgia Tech in 1992 and his Ph.D. in Operations Research from Stanford University in 1997. He was in the Department of Industrial Engineering at Arizona State University from 1997-2002, and joined the NPS faculty in 2002. His research and teaching interests include network optimization, integer programming, network interdiction, and spreadsheet models in OR. He receives support from the Office of Naval Research for military applications of optimization, including attack and defense of critical infrastructure, delaying large industrial projects and weapons programs, theater ballistic missile defense, sensor mix and deployment, naval logistics, and Navy mission planning. Professor Carlyle was awarded the Navy Superior Civilian Service Award in 2006 for work in support of OEF and OIF.

Track: Security

Tuesday, April 16, 4:40–5:30pm

Security and Critical Infrastructure

Damage to critical infrastructure systems makes headlines, whether it is a consequence of deliberate acts of people trying gain attention, or from accidents, failures, or natural disasters. The most obvious effects of such damage are the short term, high-cost, high-visibility consequences, but these should not necessarily be the primary concerns when deciding how to protect infrastructure systems. We discuss protecting critical infrastructure systems from the point of view of protecting the long-term function that the system provides, and determining the security consequences of the loss of that function. We review some basic modeling techniques, give an overview of the insights we derive from modeling critical infrastructure from this viewpoint, and conclude with some cautions against drawing “obvious” conclusions about system security without performing the appropriate modeling and analysis.